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OF THE KIND OF CASE 
'Phis is an action by Plaintiffs to t1uiet title to cer-
tain real estate in themselves. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
Plaintiffs, the fee ownern of the real estate in ques-
tion, moved the lower court for Smrnnary Judgment 
against the Defendants, who claim their interest in said 
real estate through an auditor's tax deed. The trial court 
granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
quieting title in the Plaintiffs, and res(•rving to the De-
ft>ndallt:-; a lien against tlw real estate for part of the 
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taxes paid by tht> Defendants, or their predecessors in 
interest, and further reser\'ing to the Defendants any 
rights they may have as occupying claims of said real 
estate. From said order, the Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGH'L1 ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the Decree quieting 
title in the Plaintiff's and desire that the case be re-
manded to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
Defendants further seek an order of this Court award-
ing them their costs of this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF F AiCTS 
Plaintiffs instituted this action for the purpose of 
quieting title in themselves to the real estate which is 
the subject matter of this lawsuit (R. 1-2). Plaintiffs 
claim their interest in the real estate as fee owners 
thereof (R. 8-9). Defendants claim their interest in the 
real estate as successors in interest by and through an 
auditor's tax deed (R. 9-10). 
Salt Lake County caused the property in question 
to be sold for delinquent sewer taxes (R. 17 & 20). Sub-
sequent to said sale, the Salt Lake County Auditor 
executed a tax deed in favor of Defendant's predecessors 
in interest (R. 9, 11, & 17). The tax deed given by the 
Salt Lake County Auditor was in the statutory form as 
provided in cases of tax sales for general taxes. The 
deed recites on its face that the property "was sold to 
said county at ]ffPliminary sale for non-payment of 
ge1wral taxes." Said tax deed on its upper, left-hand 
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L'.orner ls rnark<:>d b:· a11 identifieatiou number, with an 
indication that the ddirn1twnt tax(•::; in question were 
tl10::;p resnlting from a ::wwer a::;::;es::;rnent (R. 17). 
Beeamw of the ne1:·d to n·view detailed and complex 
record::; of the Salt Lah· County 'l'rea::-;urer's Office, thP 
Salt Lake Connt:· Auditor's Offiee and the Salt Lake 
County Rt.;eorder 's Offi<-'.e, a11 ""'\.n::;wer \\·a:s not immediate-
!:· ln addition, lwean::-;P of the pressing and 
lieav:· work load of the Trea:sun>r'::; Offiee and Recorder's 
Offiee in the earl.'» part of HHiS, wl1ich \ms created by 
tax collection problem::;, this aut110r was miable to obtain 
a recorder's eertificate and entified COJJY of the tax 
sale record. Accordingl:·, a general denial \\·as interposed 
in behalf of Defendants on March 7, 1969, to allow DP-
frndants adequate time to disco\'er the necessary facts 
and obtain the auditor's certifieate so that a detailed 
answer could be later filed (R. 7). 
Notwithstanding the laek of pertinent documents 
and evidence in the fill>, Plaintiff's moved for Summary 
.T ndgment on April 9, 19G9 ( R. lS). Thi::; author was 
finall:· able to obtain a certified copy of the tax sale 
record on April 28, 1969. 
In addition to tlw foregoing vroblems concerning 
filing of a detailed pleading, this author made it 
known to Mr. Lewis S. Livingston, one of the attorneys 
for Plaintiff, that the Defendants intended to make and 
a:-;sert claims as an occnpying claimant, and this author 
advist>d Mr. Li\·ingston that additional time ·would be 
n•qni red to obtain an a<-'.counting and the invoices in 
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support thereof in connection with improvements made 
upon the real estate which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
Ignoring the need for additional time for the Defen-
dants to coumnmicate as to an accounting concerning 
improvenwnts made upon the property, and the com-
pletion of a more complete responsive pleading, Plain-
tiffs noticed up their l\Iotion for Summary Judgment 
for l\lay 2G, 1969 (R. 2±). Pursuant to said notice, the 
Court went forward on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and notwithstanding the incompleteness of 
the file. Plaintiffs were granted Smnmary Judgment 
after both parties orally argued the matter, and sub-
mitted supporting memorandums (R. 32). 
Although an examination of the Salt Lake County 
Records -..rnuld disclose that Salt Lake County held a 
preliminary sale for sewer taxes for the year of 1967, 
and that a further examination of the records would 
disclose that Mel-0-Tone Enterprises paid said taxes 
in the amount of $42.75, plus penalty, interest and costs, 
or a total of $47.87, Judgment was rendered by the 
lower court without any prot(•ction of Defendants' statu-




THE AUDITOR'S TAX DEED ON WHICH DE-
FENDANTS RELY IS VALID ON ITS FACE, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW. 
Sections 17-6-3.4 and 17-G-3.6, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, provide that the enforcement of sewer taxes shall 
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be handlc•d in all re:->peds a:-; general county taxes. Spe-
('ifically, 17-G-3.4 providt>s that "ail laws ap-
plicable to the imposition, collection and enforcement of 
general county taxt>:->, induding those pertaining to the 
allowance of collection foes, to tlw imposition of penalties 
for delinquencies and to the :;ale of property for non-
payment of taxe:;, shall be avvlicable to the taxes so 
levied for the di :-;trict." ( 1£m phasis added.) Section 
17-(5-3.G indicates that ll]Jon cntification of delinquent 
:->e\\·pr charges to eith<,r the County Treasurer or County 
Assessor that they 
become a lien on the delinquent premises on a 
parity with and collectible at the same time and 
in the same manner as general county taxes are 
a lien on such premises and are collectible. All 
methods of enforcement available for the collec-
tion of such general county taxes, including sale 
of the delinquent premises, shall be available and 
shall be used in the collection of delinquent sewer 
charges. 
Aecordingly, tlw ('mplo_\·ment by the County Trea-
surer and Count.'· Auditor of the provisions of Chapter 
10, Title 59, Utah Cod<· Annotated 1953, to collect de-
linquent sewPr taxes is not invalid, since the quoted por-
tions of the above cited statutt•s expressly empower and 
reqnire that sewer taxes be collected in the same fashion 
followed in this case. 'fhe only form of tax deed as pre-
scribt>d h.'· the :-;tatutes is set forth in Section 59-10-64 
(5), Utah Code Annotafrd 1%3, and that form was em-
ployed h.'· the Nalt Lak\' Count_\· Auditor in the case 
lwforP this l'onrt. Although the paragraph ending the 
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body of the auditor's tax dPed states that the property 
"\vas sold to said county at preliminary sale for non-
payment of gen<-'ral taxes," the delinquent taxpayer is 
put on notice that the sale took place as a result of a 
sewer tax delinquency. rrhe identification number stamp-
ed in the upper, left-hand corm·r, and the indication that 
the tax was for ''sewer", is an explicit and express 
reference to the appropriate county tax sale record. The 
Salt Lakt• County Auditor followed the express statu-
tory mandates in connection with sale procedures fol-
lowed, and the ultimate granting of a tax deed. Accord-
ingly, it is submitted that said tax deed is not invalid 
on its face, as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY 
AND PREMATURELY GRANTED BY THE LOWER 
COURT. 
This Court has consistently recognized the harsh-
ness and the many dangers implicit in the granting of 
smmnary relief under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The cases are legion in snvport of this proposi-
tion; however, Defendants merely call attention to the 
case of Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 
11 U.2d 353, 359 P.2d 18 (Utah 1969). At page 19 this 
Court indicates that the Summary Judgment remedy 
"is appropriate only where the favored party makes a 
showing which precludes, as a matter of law, the award-
ing of ((ny relief to tht· losing part.''·" (Emphasis addPd.) 
It seems patently avparent from the record that the 
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lower cumt ha:; deprived the Defendant::; of valuable 
right:; and relief, otherwi::;e allowable in this case. 
S1Jecifically, a lien i::; available to Defendants for 
$103.41 for the delinquent :;ewer taxes which were re-
covered by Salt Lake County as a rewlt of the tax 
:;ale in question and a lien i::; available to Defendants 
in the amount of $-156.77 for 1968 general property 
taxes paid by the Defendants. The::;e amounts were re-
sened a:; lien:; under the Decree of Sunnnary Judg-
ment awarded by the lower court; however, the lien::> 
re::;erved to Defendant::; under Section 59-10-65, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, are intere::;t bearing, and the 
lower court's Decree makes no provision for continuing 
interest. In addition, the Decree of the lower court made 
no provision for the 19G7 sewer taxes paid by Defen-
dant::; in the amonnt of $47.87, plu::; accruing interest. To 
be sure, evidence of this latter tax is absent from the 
file, but given adequate time to tie discovery matters 
down, it is submitted that this would become part of 
the matters plead, a:; it should pro1wrly be. 
rrhe Decree of the lower court, \Vhile preserving two 
of the three outstanding liens accorded the Defendants 
by statnte, fails to make any provision therein for for-
clo:-mrt>. Section 59-10-G5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
lffO\'idPs that tax liens ''shall be foreclosed in any action 
\\'herein the invalidity of such tax title is determined. If 
;-;ueh lien is not foreclosed at the time of the determina-
tion of th<' invalidity of ;-;udt tax title, any later action 
to suel1 lien shall be forever barred ... " Al-
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though at first blush it seems that the lower court pro-
tected and preserved outstanding rights of the Defen-
dants, the Decree nonetheless effectively takes away 
valuable rights of the Defendants, as is apparent from 
the cited statute. 
This Court construed a similar lien statute in the 
case of San Juan County v. Jen, Inc., 16 U.2d 394, 401 
P.2d 953 (Utah 1965). The Court concluded that the 
statute involved created only lien rights, and not any 
in personam rights as against the owner. Therefore, 
Defendants respectfully submit that the only remedy 
available Defendants is a foreclosure action, and if they 
cannot bring such an action, they are forever barred. 
This would seem to be further supported by the "one-
action" rule which is followed in this jurisdiction in 
connection 'vith the foreclosure of mortgages on real 
estate. 
Since the Defendants took occupancy of the premises 
in question, they have expended large sums of money, 
and would make claim therefore for valuable improve-
ments rendered as occupying claimants under the pur-
view of Chapter 6 of rritle 57, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. It would seem that it would be more economical, 
considering the expenses to the parties and the time 
and expense to the Court, for the Court to dispose of the 
occupying claimants' rights as a part of this lawsuit. 
Moreover, Section 57-6-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
indicates that the Plaintiff shall not be put in posses-
sion of the property until there has been a full corn-
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pliance with the Clia1)ter. According!>·, until there has 
lwPn a trial 011 the merits, it s<:>ems dear under the 
statute that the Plaintiffs, though the trial court has 
quiett>d title in them, a1·e not entitled to pos::;ession of 
the premises, and an· t 1nahle to move forward with a 
disposition thereof. 
POINT III 
THE APPLICATION OF THE APPLICABLE 
LAW BY THE LOWER COURT CONSTITUTES A 
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY TO THE DEFEN-
DANTS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The Fourtt:•enth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States pro,·ides that no "state [shall] deprive 
any person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law .... " Section 1 of Article 1, Constitution 
of U tali, accords to the citizens of the State the inalien-
able right to "acquin·, possess and protect property ... ", 
and Section 7 of Article 1, Constitution of Utah, pro-
,·ides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without dne process of law." This Court 
in tlw case of Christiansen v. Harri::;, 109 Utah 1, 163 
P.:Zd 314 (Utah 19-±5), at Page 316 indicates that each 
party is entitled to his day in court, "with the privilege 
of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his 
cau.se or his defen::;c ... " (Emphasis added.) Also, the 
Court alludes to the standard definition which indicates 
that a conrt shonld render jndgment only after trial. It 
is appan•nt that ])pfendants have been deprived of their 
day in court in thi::; case. 
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'rhe Legislature has granted certain protection to 
tax deed purchasers, or tlws(_' holding under them, in 
clear and unambiguous language. Section 59-10-64 ( 7), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides that "a copy of the 
record of the tax sale and a copy of the auditor's en-
dorsement made thereon, duly certified by the recorder 
under the seal of his office, shall be lJrima-facie evidence 
in all courts of the com·eyance to the county in fee simple 
of the property therein described and of the regularity 
of all proceedings preliminary thereto." l\loreover, Sub-
section 5 of the same Statute lJrovides that when the 
auditor executes and delivers his tax deed that it "shall 
be prima-facie evidence of all proceedings subsequent 
to the preliminary sale and of the conveyance of the 
property to the grantee in fee simple." Certainly with-
out more, it seems plainly clear that the Legislature in-
tended that tax title purchasers, or successors in interest, 
would be entitled to their day in court to protect valuable 
property interests, which they have acquired under the 
Statutes of the Statt>s of Utah. Before the lower court 
entertained any .Motion for Snuunary Judgment, it first 
should have inquired into the circumstances surround-
ing the assessment, levy and sale, and notices thereof, 
and the circumstances nndeT which the Plaintiffs failed 
to meet their tax liabilities. 'l'he rPcord itself indicates 
that Plaintiffs wen• guilty of several lapses in paying 
the taxes on the property in question, so it well could 
be concluded that there might have been some willful 
ignoring of the law, a suhj1·ct into which it is 
the trial court should }iayp made some inquiry. 
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The failure of the lower court to prnvide for fore-
dmmre of D('fondants' lit·ns, which an; allovved the De-
frndants un<lPr Sedion 39-10-05, lJtah Code Annotated 
1953, in its Decree t1uieting title in the Plaintiffs, obvious-
J.v deprives Defendants of valuable propert.\· rights ·with-
out DuP Prncess of La\Y. Since the lower court has in-
validated the tax. deed under \\ ltieh Defendants claim, 
a11<l since Section 59-10-ii5 nt·at1:>s a "one-action" rule ' 
tlw Defrndants liaH not been ginn their day in court. 
.Jloreowr, the Defendants have not liad tlH•ir day in court 
concerning any claims they may have as occnp:·ing claim-
ants of the property in question. 
Although this Court in ib prior decisions has ju-
dicially legislated mrny man:· of tlH.' rights afforded by 
the Legislature to tax d(•Pd purchasers, or their succes-
sors, it is respectfully that tlwre has been 
;;0111P recognition of this fact b:· thP Court. 8pecifically, 
in the case of Toronto , .. Sht'ffidd, llS Utah ±60, 222 P.2d 
G94 (Utah 1950), the late and estee1w•d Justice \Volfe, 
in his concurring opinion, allndPd to tltP very problem 
rnis(•d by this cast>. At PagPs 603 and GO±, Justice ·w olfe 
pointed out that tl1P courts bear 80llH' rPs1wnsibility for 
the muddled situation concerning tax titles. HP indicated 
that tlwre should be ::;0111e relaxation of the "strict com-
pliance'' doctrine. Where tlwrP han• been simple ad-
ministrative ornis::;ion::; or not prPjudicial 
to the taxpa:·er, he suggpsh>d that such tt>clmical defects 
sl10uld not aid thP dPlinqnent taxpayer. To be sure, the 
taxpa.\·1·r is (•ntitlPd to e(•rtain proh>ctions which the 
statut(•s adPquatt>l:· insure. Hmrev(•r, he should not be 
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allowed to sit idly by while thl• county proceeds to sell 
his valuable property, and then later make entreaties to 
the court that he sl1011ld be put back in his previous posi-
tion, at the expense of another e<1nally important citizen. 
The tax deed purchaser, or his successor in interest, 
should be able to place some reliance upon the explicit 
statutes of this state iu evaluating what potential prop-
erty rights they may acquire, or may have acquired. 
Based upon a reading of the statute:-;, the tax deed pur-
chaser is then lulled into a sPnse of :some security, and 
may then go forward with large expenditures of money 
to alter or impron:: the property, as is the case with De-
fendants herein. In a different context, it would seem 
that the judicial legislation prevalent in this area of the 
law might be rightly constrn<:>d and held to be en-
trapment. 
CON<;LU8ION 
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable 
to the Appellants, it must bl' concluded that the lower 
court has deprived Appt>llants of valuable property 
rights, without any consideration therefor. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that there had never been any Notice of 
Readiness for Trial filed with the court, and notwith-
standing the fact that both parties had conducted some 
of their discovery work ov<:>r many months, the lower 
court chose to dispose of the whole case on a very 
narrow, legal point, disposing of all possible issues, with-
out the advantag<· of all the evidence before the court. 
Accordingly, Defondants-Appt>llants have been deprived 
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of thPir in court, and their opportunity to be heard 
at> to important it>t>ues bearing on the preservation 
of valuable pro1wrty righb granted them under the 
StatntPs of the State of Utah. 
lt is l'('t>pedfnlly t>tdnnitted that this Court must 
rcverne tht• lo\Yer conrt, and the cat>e 8hould be remand-
Pd to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
Costs should])(' awarded Ap1Jellant8. 
Re8pectfully 8Ubmitted, 
RIGTRUP 
±GG East 5th South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Coun8el for Appellants 
